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Measuring the Impact of a BSE
Announcement on U.S. Retail Beef 
Sales: A Time-Series Analysis
Christian S. L. Crowley and Yoshiaki Shimazaki
On December 23, 2003, Agriculture Secretary Ann M. Veneman announced that
the United States Department of Agriculture had diagnosed the first U.S. case of
bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), commonly known as “mad cow
disease.” This study uses supermarket sales data to analyze the effect of the BSE
announcement on U.S. retail beef sales, finding a statistically significant disruption
of sales. In addition, we develop a forecast of retail beef sales revenues in the
hypothetical absence of BSE. The forecast implies that the BSE announcement
may have reduced domestic retail beef revenues in excess of $11 billion in the
post-BSE period.
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On December 23, 2003, according to the USDA Newsroom (2003), Agriculture
Secretary Ann M. Veneman announced that the United States Department of
Agriculture had diagnosed the first U.S. case of bovine spongiform encephalopathy
(BSE), commonly known as “mad cow disease.” This disease of cattle had
previously been found to be the precursor of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD), an
invariably fatal brain-wasting disease in humans. USDA’s Food Safety and
Inspection Service (2004) reports that this single case of BSE resulted in nearly
38,000 pounds of beef being recalled as a safety measure to prevent the BSE agent
from entering the U.S. food supply.
This analysis examines the effects of unanticipated announcements, such as the
discovery of BSE in the U.S. domestic cattle herd, by studying retail beef purchases
in the periods before and after the announcement. Piggott and Marsh (2004) provide
a brief survey of the literature on demand effects of food safety announcements,
highlighting several recent papers with a focus on the U.S. meat market. Lusk and
Schroeder (2002) found that beef recalls have a marginal impact on futures prices,
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and Thomsen and McKenzie (2001) observed that recalls lead to small losses for
meat processing shareholders, indicating a market anticipation of an adverse impact
on demand.
McKenzie and Thomsen (2001) summarize the effects of health-related announce-
ments on beef demand, concluding that while the effects of announcements con-
cerning food-related long-term health risks such as increased cholesterol levels can
be seen in low-frequency (quarterly or annual) data, studies using high-frequency
(daily) data yielded mixed results. These authors use event study methodology to
show that announcements about foodborne pathogens have stronger effects when the
disease in question is a serious one (i.e., Class 1 recalls), and when the product at
risk is more susceptible to becoming tainted, such as ground beef for E. Coli.
Dahlgran and Fairchild (2002) concluded that consumers tend to forget about
adverse publicity concerning meat safety, and eventually return to established pat-
terns of meat consumption. Results of our analysis reveal that U.S. retail beef sales
suffered significant disruption following the BSE announcement. This disruption
seems to have had a persistent level effect, shifting beef sales to a lower level in the
post-BSE period, in contrast to the results reported by Dahlgran and Fairchild. The
month-to-month variations in retail beef sales, however, did appear to return to their
normal pattern about two months after the announcement. These persistently low
sales have most likely resulted in a loss of retail beef revenue, which we estimate
may be on the order of $11.1 billion over the post-BSE period.
The remainder of the paper is organized into eight major sections. First, back-
ground is provided through an introduction to BSE and a summary of the inter-
national experience with the disease. Next, the sources are given for the data sets
used in the study, followed by a description of the data via an overview of the U.S.
retail beef market before and after the BSE announcement. An economic interpreta-
tion of the shock is then presented, highlighting the nature of the post-December
2003 structural shift. In the methodology section, we develop the ARIMA model
used in investigating the nature of the shock associated with the discovery of BSE,
and the next section describes an experiment with event study modeling techniques
for this episode. The revenue effects of the BSE announcement are then investigated
by considering what revenues might have been in the absence of a BSE announce-
ment. The final section offers concluding remarks and a summary of our findings.
Background
Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), commonly known as mad cow disease,
is a progressive neurological disorder of cattle caused by an agent present in the
tissues of infected animals. BSE affects a cow’s central nervous system, leading to
the development of spongy lesions on the brain. The Federal Interagency Working
Group (2003) reports that BSE has been a concern internationally since the UK
experienced a BSE epidemic, which peaked in 1993 with roughly 1,000 new bovine
cases per week. The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
reported in 2004 that the outbreak may have resulted from feeding cattle with meat-Crowley and Shimazaki Impact of a BSE Announcement on U.S. Retail Beef Sales   21
1  Note, however, that vCJD differs from CJD in being more prevalent in persons under age 30.
and-bone meal derived from sheep infected with scrapie, a fatal degenerative disease
affecting the central nervous system of sheep and goats.
BSE and scrapie are both characterized as a transmissible spongiform encepha-
lopathy (TSE), according to online information provided by the USDA’s Animal and
Plant Health Inspection Service (2004). TSEs are the subject of increased attention
and concern because of the link between BSE in cattle and variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob
disease (vCJD, commonly referred to as simply CJD) in humans.
1 In 2004, an update
on BSE and CJD by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention cited
considerable epidemiological and causal evidence pointing to BSE exposure as the
source of CJD. CJD, like other TSEs, is a degenerative brain disease that is invari-
ably fatal. The BSE agent has been found in the brain, spinal cord, retina, dorsal root
ganglia, distal ileum, and bone marrow of infected cattle. In addition, Japan’s
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries reported in a November 2004 press
release that the BSE agent was found in nerves in the muscle tissue of a 94-month
old cow—documenting the first time the BSE agent has been observed in muscle
tissue, a portion of the animal likely to enter the human food chain.
Prior to the 2004 U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention announcement,
the UK Health Minister released an announcement in March 1996 suggesting a
possible link between BSE and CJD (Fisher, 1997). This news release triggered a
BSE scare in the UK, disrupting meat demand and causing one of the most problem-
atic years in recent history for the British beef industry. Fisher reports that the 1996
UK BSE scare saw consumption of vulnerable meats (beef, veal, mutton, and lamb)
drop sharply: 1996 UK beef purchases were 15.9% lower than the 1995 level.
Demand shifted in this period to meats that were perceived as safer by consumers,
with most of the market share being gained by poultry.
Other European countries had similar experiences with falling beef demand when
BSE was found on the continent in late 2000. A BSE crisis struck France at the end
of October 2000. Spencer (2002) reports that in November 2000 there was a drop of
40% in French household beef purchases. The first recorded case of BSE in
Germany was announced in November 2000. Over the following year, German
households decreased their consumption of beef, with 2001 sales 25% below 2000
levels (Fisher, 2002). At the height of the crisis, German beef purchases were down
67% from the previous year’s level. Beef was removed from the menus of many
restaurants, and meat processors excluded beef ingredients from their products. The
collapse in demand resulted in a dramatic and persistent drop in cattle prices, as
consumers switched to poultry and, to a lesser extent, pork.
Japan has also seen an outbreak of BSE. The first Japanese case was reported on
September 10, 2001, and resulted in annual per capita consumption dropping 17%,
as reported by the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (2003). The
Ministry data also show that Japanese demand is sensitive to international announce-
ments as well as domestic alerts. Specifically, in 1996, the year of the British BSE
scare, Japanese per capita beef consumption dropped 8%, from 11.9 kg to 11 kg.22   Spring 2005 Journal of Agribusiness
While this study highlights the experience of the UK, France, Germany, and
Japan, these are not the only countries to have experienced an outbreak of BSE. For
more detail on the progress of the disease internationally, interested readers are
directed to Fox and Peterson (2004). For the four countries mentioned here, govern-
ment responses consisting of mandatory testing and quality labeling schemes were
seen as instrumental in helping beef demand to recover after several months. Euro-
pean testing standards are fairly strict, including mandatory testing of all cows over
age 42 months, all cows over age 30 months intended for human consumption, all
cows found dead over age 24 months, and all animals subject to emergency
slaughtering. In addition, each European member state must test a random sample
of at least 10,000 cows per year. Still, as reported by the Japan Weekly Monitor
(2004), only Japan has mandated universal testing for cows destined for human
consumption, so it is conceivable that BSE outbreaks could reoccur in any of several
countries, resulting in a new series of domestic or international demand shocks.
Testing practices in the United States cover a relatively small portion of the total
herd, focusing on testing within the group of 195,000 animals considered at high risk
of BSE infection (Dworkin, 2004). Some consider this level of testing to be insuffi-
cient, given the magnitude of the impact of the first U.S. case of BSE on the beef
market. The following sections of this study investigate whether U.S. practices to
date have succeeded in restoring consumer confidence and returning retail beef sales
to somewhere near their pre-BSE levels.
Data Sources
Much of the data for the following sections of this study were collected from
the central website of the USDA’s Economic Research Service (ERS)—
www.ers.usda.gov. According to information provided on the Livestock Marketing
Information Center website, the ERS has been given the responsibility of publishing
retail meat purchase prices and quantity measures for representative meat products,
as mandated by The Livestock Mandatory Reporting Act of 1999 (P.L. 106-78, Title
IX, Section 257, Publication of Information on Retail Purchase Prices for Repre-
sentative Meat Products). This act requires the compilation and publication of retail
purchase prices for “representative food products made from beef, pork, chicken,
turkey, veal, or lamb.”
The ERS database contains monthly average retail sales data for selected cuts of
red meat and poultry, derived from electronic supermarket scanner data. The data are
from supermarkets across the United States accounting for approximately 20% of
U.S. supermarket sales, thus reflecting the diversity of the U.S. retail climate. This
study considers the index of volume sold (2001 levels set equal to 100) for selected
cuts and aggregate categories of beef, poultry, pork, and all other meats.
For purposes of this analysis, we chose to use retail scanner data (USDA/ERS,
2004c,d), rather than more commonly used “disappearance” data, as we believe the
former more accurately reflect consumer trends. King, Tietyen, and Vickner (2000)
explain that disappearance data proxies beef consumption as the residual of initialCrowley and Shimazaki Impact of a BSE Announcement on U.S. Retail Beef Sales   23
beef stocks less net exports and inventories. Nevertheless, it is not always clear
where the beef actually “disappears to.” Some meat may be purchased by restaurants,
caterers, or other commercial or industrial outfits. These intermediate purchases
presumably reach consumers eventually, though in addition to any value added
provided, there may be some unrecorded leakage along the way. Because many meat
products cannot be easily relegated to a producer’s inventories during periods of low
market prices, it is likely some of the “disappeared” beef could be discarded by
producers rather than purchased by consumers. We argue that the retail scanner data
better captures the portion of beef production actually going to consumers.
Scanner data are collected at the point of sale by supermarkets using electronic
scanners in the checkout lines. Supermarkets are defined as retail grocery stores with
dairy, produce, fresh meat, packaged food, and non-food departments, and annual
sales of $2 million or more. ERS thus excludes butcher shops, warehouse clubs, con-
venience stores, and restaurants from this data set. Three variables are reported in the
data set: (a) a feature-weighted average price, (b) an index of volume sold, and (c) the
percentage of volume sold under feature, where “feature” indicates discounts offered
to consumers through retailers’ weekly feature advertisements. Data are reported for
selected cuts and aggregate categories of beef, pork, poultry, lamb, and veal.
The Feature-Weighted Average Price for a meat category is computed by dividing
total dollar sales by the index for volume sold (where sales volume in 2001 is set to
100). This price therefore includes the effects of retailers’ weekly sales specials. As
the price series is reported in nominal dollars, we convert the series to 2001 dollars
using the U.S. Department of Labor’s Consumer Price Index (CPI). The ERS Index
for Volume Sold is calculated by dividing the pounds of meat sold in a particular
month by the 2001 annual average of pounds sold. This ratio is multiplied by 100
to obtain the volume index. The Percent of Volume Sold Under Feature is the pounds
of meat sold under feature divided by the total pounds sold, multiplied by 100. (The
data for U.S. retail beef sales both prior to and since the BSE announcement are
defined and discussed in the next section.)
Scanner price data can produce some unexpected results depending on the market-
ing decisions of retail outlets. These unexpected results, described below in the
section on the economic interpretation of the BSE shock, are what led us to consider
an auxiliary price series, one without the effects of retailers’ weekly sales specials.
The auxiliary series chosen is taken from the USDA/ERS (2004a) online price
spread tables, which report data from October 2002 onward. These tables provide
a measure of value for agricultural products reflecting changes in price only, as
traditional price spreads can be affected by consumers switching between more- and
less-processed products. Thus the beef price spread table gives a retail “value” for
a pound of beef, meaning the meat itself, regardless of the value added by any
processing that may be involved in the cuts chosen by consumers. We make use of
this data set in an effort to isolate the effect of the December 2003 BSE announce-
ment on demand for beef only, rather than the demand for the meat plus meat
processing services. The data from this value series are used below to develop an
economic interpretation of the BSE shock.24   Spring 2005 Journal of Agribusiness
Data Description
The USDA’s Annual Meat Report (USDA/National Agricultural Statistics Service,
2003) defines red meat as beef, veal, pork, lamb, or mutton, and documents that U.S.
red meat production totaled 46.8 billion pounds in 2003. This was only 1.2% below
the record high production level of 2002. Beef production alone totaled 26.3 billion
pounds in 2003, 3% below the previous record high, also set in 2002. Commercial
cattle slaughter remained high as well in 2003: 35.5 million head, down only 1%
from 2002. Commercial calf slaughter totaled 1 million head, down 4% from 2002.
As can be seen from these figures, U.S. beef production was at a relatively high level
immediately prior to the BSE announcement in December 2003. This situation
presents the opportunity for a natural experiment on demand shocks: We assume that
any decline in beef purchases in the period from December 2003 on was not due to
a reduction in supply, but represents a demand-side response.
In spite of high production levels, retail purchases in 2003 were somewhat below
those of 2002, as shown in figure 1. Retail sales in 2003 fell short of 2002 levels for
all months except August, and average yearly beef purchases for 2003 (prior to the
BSE announcement) were 11% below those of 2002. Figure 2 shows the year-to-
year percentage change in monthly supermarket sales, illustrating the lower 2003
levels prior to the BSE discovery. Some of this shortfall was countered by increased
exports. The U.S. Customs Service (2004) reports in its online “Foreign Agricultural
Trade Commodity Aggregations” that there was an increase of 22% in U.S. beef and
veal exports from 2002 to 2003.
The year 2002 was one of record highs for both beef production and sales, so it
should come as no surprise that sales in 2003 were consistently lower than those of
the previous year. Nevertheless, these lower purchases in 2003 may be part of a
longer term downward trend. Beef’s consumption share (out of all meats) has been
falling steadily since 1975, reflecting the socioeconomic, demographic, and lifestyle
trends favoring white meats and fish over red meat. Most notably, consumers have
increasingly substituted away from beef, especially in favor of chicken products in
their diet. Figure 3 presents data taken from the USDA/ERS Commodity Yearbooks
(2004), illustrating how U.S. meat producers have responded to these trends—i.e.,
between 1975 and 1999, beef’s production share of all meats fell from 47% to 28%,
while poultry’s share rose from 28% to 52%.
Agriculture Secretary Ann M. Veneman’s announcement on December 23, 2003
of the discovery of BSE in a cow in Washington State had an immediate negative
response on retail sales, as shown in figure 4. December has historically been a high-
sales month, but the BSE announcement just before the 2003 holidays apparently
drove down beef sales for the entire month. The difference in sales volume between
December and November 2003 (the last month before the announcement) may be
even more dramatic than it appears: a USDA/Economic Research Service (2004d)
data revision for the retail meat scanner data reports that sales for November 2003
would likely have been higher, had it not been for labor stoppages at some retail
outlets.Crowley and Shimazaki Impact of a BSE Announcement on U.S. Retail Beef Sales   25
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       Figure 1. Pre-BSE retail beef purchases: 2002 and 2003
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Figure 2. Pre-BSE year-to-year percentage changes in retail 
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Figure 5 shows the year-to-year percentage changes in retail beef sales. Sales for
December 2003, for example, were 43% below the December 2002 levels, giving
the month of the BSE announcement a lower sales volume than any previous month.
As observed from figure 5, retail sales remain low in the post-BSE period. Sales
volume for January 2004 was down 35% from the January 2003 level, and 33%
below the 35-month pre-BSE average. In fact, January 2004 shows the lowest level
of sales in the data, excluding the announcement month of December 2003. By
February 2004, sales appear to have recovered somewhat, down only 9% from
February 2003, and 14% below the pre-BSE average. This pattern of an initial drop
in sales volume followed by a recovery seems to mirror the experience of the Euro-
pean countries examined earlier.
March and April 2004, however, tell a different story. Beef sales dropped again,
with March 2004 sales down 40% from March 2003, and 31% below the pre-BSE
average. This made March the third lowest volume month since January 2001. April
2004 sales were lower still: 22% below April 2003 levels, and 38% below the
pre-BSE average, falling to the same record low as December 2003, the month of the
initial BSE announcement. In May 2004, there are again signs of a recovery in sales,
with sales volume up 4% above May 2003, and only 6% below the pre-BSE average.
Yet once again, the recovery was seen to be short-lived. June 2004 sales volume was
35% below that of June 2003, and 26% below the pre-BSE average, while July 2004
sales volume was 22% below that of July 2003, and 25% below the pre-BSE
average. The most recent month available in the data set was August 2004, when
sales were 19% below the August 2003 level. These figures reveal that as of eight
months after the initial shock caused by the December BSE announcement, there had
been no persistent recovery in beef demand.
Economic Interpretation of the Shock
Based on this examination, December 2003 seems to be a point of structural shift.
The nature of this shift is explored below. Figure 6 shows the volume series with esti-
mated trend lines split into two portions: the first portion before the BSE announce-
ment (periods 1 through 35), and the second portion after the BSE announcement
(periods 36 through 44). Note that these trend lines were found using ordinary least
squares (OLS), but neither the negative trend before the announcement nor the positive
trend after the announcement is statistically significant at the 5% level. These trend
lines are included here for demonstration purposes only, illustrating the immediate
and persistent drop in retail beef sales caused by the BSE announcement in
December 2003, which may be indicative of a beef demand shock.
It is widely accepted that agricultural supply is relatively fixed in the short run,
due to the time required for raising livestock, and the perishable nature of the
products, which limits storage possibilities. Given the relatively short time period
under consideration in this study, and given the apparent absence of any catastrophic
supply shocks such as bad weather or livestock epidemics, the drop in sales should
be attributed to a shift in the demand curve.Crowley and Shimazaki Impact of a BSE Announcement on U.S. Retail Beef Sales   29
2  The two-sample t-test statistic is given by
   T ' ( ¯ Y1 & ¯ Y2)'
var1
N1
%
var2
N2
.
The null hypothesis of equal means is rejected at probability α for where degrees of freedom T < &t(α/2,ν) or T > t(α/2,ν),
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.
Microeconomic theory states that a decrease in demand (a leftward shift of the
demand curve) will lead to a decrease in equilibrium market price, ceteris paribus.
Thus, we should be able to see this price drop in the data. Figure 7 displays a time-
series graph over the full sample period for the feature-weighted average price
reported in the ERS scanner data. Recall that the data have been deflated to 2001
dollars using the CPI.
Figure 7 shows a price spike for December 2003, up 27.8% from both December
2002 and December 2001, and 28% higher than the pre-BSE average price for beef.
This is the opposite of what we would expect to see—i.e., an increase in price
suggesting either an increase in demand or a decrease in supply. But in this case,
supply is known to have remained at high levels, and the fall in purchases belies an
increase in demand. The explanation for this apparent contradiction lies in the nature
of the price reported by the ERS. As clarified in the Livestock Marketing Informa-
tion System online website and in the data sources section of this paper, the price in
the ERS scanner data is a weighted average of prices at checkout, taken across all
the retailers in the sample. Consequently, this price includes the discounting effects
of featuring, or weekly supermarket sales promotions. When comparing two months
with similar sales volume, if one month has fewer promotions, the feature-weighted
average price for that month will be higher.
Figure 8 shows how the Percent of Volume Sold Under Feature has varied over
time. December 2003 shows the smallest percentage of volume sold under feature
for the entire sample, 3.5 standard deviations below the pre-BSE sample average.
Hence, it is likely that December 2003 was a month with relatively few beef
promotions, which would account for both lower volume sold and a higher feature-
weighted average price.
As reported by Crowley and Shimazaki (2005), other countries experiencing a
BSE outbreak saw a sharp decline in beef-related advertising immediately after the
outbreak. This appears to have been the case for the United States as well. To test
the hypothesis that there has been less featuring for beef, we conducted a two-
sample t-test
2 on the pre-BSE and post-BSE averages. The pre-BSE average per-
centage sold under feature was 41.1%, and the post-BSE average was 34.9%; the
null hypothesis that these two means are from the same population is rejected at the
0.001 probability level.Crowley and Shimazaki Impact of a BSE Announcement on U.S. Retail Beef Sales   31
As described above in the section on data sources, ERS’s price spread tables
(USDA/ERS, 2004a) report the “value” of a pound of beef at retail outlets, rather
than a weighted average, which includes the effects of featuring. Figure 9 presents
a time-series graph for this retail value from October 2002 to August 2004. For the
period shown, the retail value displays a steady increase, from $3.34 per pound in
October 2002, to a high of $4.50 by November 2003. Once again, the data have been
deflated to 2001 dollars using the CPI. The figure shows what we would expect with
a drop in demand. Specifically, in December 2003, the month of the BSE announce-
ment, the retail value reverses its climb, logging the first sizeable drop since May
2003. Then in January 2004, retail value falls again, showing the largest drop in the
sample; this is the only instance of two consecutive drops in the available data.
Thereafter, the value is steady at $4.19 per pound, beginning to climb again only in
April 2004, as the effects of the BSE shock finally wear off. This drop, coincident
with the discovery of BSE in the United States, provides additional evidence that the
BSE announcement served as a negative demand shock in U.S. retail beef sales.
Methodology
As previously discussed in the data description section, figure 3 shows beef’s loss
of market share over the past few decades in the United States. The Alberta (Canada)
provincial government reports in its November 1998 Market Clippings that U.S. per
capita beef consumption has been falling steadily, from a peak in 1976 of about 127
pounds per person to about 95 pounds by 1997. Given this fact, we first considered
whether any short-term negative trend could be identified in our sample, which
contains retail sales data from January 2001 through August 2004. OLS regression
of beef sales on Time and a constant, for the pre-BSE period (January 2001 through
November 2003) suggests no trend: the estimated coefficient for Time was !0.191,
with a standard error of 0.241 and a t-statistic of !0.79.
The presence of a long-term negative trend combined with no apparent trend over
the short run suggests that, as with many business and economic time series, beef
sales display a stochastic trend, or that the series is a random walk with drift.
Diebold (1998) asserts these series are best modeled using ARIMA specifications,
i.e., by differencing the series and fitting a stationary model to the differences. To
model retail beef sales over the pre-BSE period (January 2001 through November
2003), we applied the time-series estimation procedure outlined by Maddala (1992).
We examined the correlogram of the first differences of the retail sales series,
finding damped oscillations, which indicates that the first-difference series is a
stationary process. The partial autocorrelation function drops over the first two
displacements, suggesting there may be an autoregressive relationship with the
first and second lagged values of retail beef sales. This led us to choose the
ARIMA(1,1,2) model, expressed as follows:
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Table 1. Estimation Results for ARIMA(1,1,2) Model 
(dependent variable = First Difference of Retail Sales Volume)
Description Coefficient Estimate
Standard
Error t-Statistic
Prob
 P > |t|
Autoregressive Term (AR) β0 0.697    0.215 3.24      0.010
Moving Average Terms (MA) β1
β2
!1.890   
1.000   
0.321
0.327
!5.89    
3.06    
 0.000
 0.002
No. of Observations = 34                                         
Wald = 687.16                                          χ
2
[3]
Log Likelihood = !137.71                                         
RMSE = 13.20                                         
ln(AIC) = 5.34                                         
ln(SIC) = 5.47                                         
Notes: RMSE is root mean squared error, AIC is Akaike information criterion, and SIC is Schwartz information
criterion.
where yt is the first difference of beef sales volume in period t. The model statistics
are reported in table 1, and show that the estimated coefficients of the model are
significant at less than the 1% level.
The estimated series is graphed against the historical (differenced) beef sales
series in figure 10. The vertical line to the left of 2003m12 marks the end of the
pre-BSE period, taken to be November 2003. Observations to the right of this line,
in the post-BSE period from December 2003 onward, are the one-step-ahead fore-
casts for the estimated series.
Over the pre-BSE period, our model has a root mean squared error of 13.2 index
points (table 1); recall that the ERS retail sales volume is reported in terms of an
index based on 2001 average sales. For December 2003 and January 2004, the model
overpredicts the change in sales by 34.5 index points and 31.7 index points,
respectively, the two largest forecast errors in the sample. The root mean squared
error in the post-BSE period error (from February 2004 on) is 18.6 index points. The
outlier nature of December 2003 and January 2004 is shown graphically in figure 11,
which presents a close-up view of the predicted changes in post-BSE retail sales
volume, along with the 2-standard error band. This figure shows that the estimates
for December 2003 and January 2004 both lie outside the 2-standard error band, but
from February 2004 onward, the estimates lie within the band.
Based on the above discussion and findings, we conclude that the BSE announce-
ment in December 2003 had an immediate short-term impact on the change in sales,
resulting in reduced sales levels in the post-BSE period. In other words, there
appears to have been a downward-level shift in retail sales volume, but after the
initial shock, sales fluctuations seem to have returned to their pre-BSE behavior.
Thus, the model that was conditioned on the pre-shock sales volume continues to
represent the data well after the shock.Crowley and Shimazaki Impact of a BSE Announcement on U.S. Retail Beef Sales   35
An Event Study Exploration
The literature on demand responses to food safety recalls makes frequent use of
event studies to measure the impact of these announcements (e.g., McKenzie and
Thomsen, 2001). In addition to the ARIMA methodology described above, we also
carried out an exploratory event study using the entire sequence of retail beef sales.
This was done with the hope of being able to measure the average effect of the BSE
announcement within the time-series framework. In performing the event study, we
include in the ARIMA specification a dummy variable that takes on the value of one
(Event = 1) only for the period(s) of the BSE announcement. Because the announce-
ment came nearly at the end of December 2003, we experimented with setting the
event dummy equal to one for both December 2003 and January 2004. However,
better results were obtained using only December 2003 as the event month. The
coefficient on the event dummy can be interpreted as the event period’s change in
retail beef sales volume above and beyond the expected change.
Using the ARIMA(1,1,2) specification developed in (1) above, the regression
results show a large negative coefficient for the event dummy, !25.1, with a standard
error of 13.27 and a t-statistic of !1.89, indicating the event dummy is significant
at the 10% level. Although the event dummy was found to be significant, the
remainder of the estimated variables were less significant than in the original
ARIMA model, with the moving average variables faring considerably worse than
the autoregressive component. We chose to adapt the original ARIMA(1,1,2) speci-
fication rather than specify a different ARIMA model for the event study, in order
to retain some degree of comparability between the two models. Other ARIMA
specifications we considered were unable to show an improvement over the
ARIMA(1,1,2); there seems to be a tradeoff between significance of the ARIMA
variables and significance of the event dummy.
Using the ARIMA(1,1,2), the negative coefficient on the event dummy indicates
a negative shock in the differenced series of beef sales. The conclusion to be drawn
from this brief event study is the same as from the original ARIMA model: the BSE
announcement seems to be responsible for a downward-level shift in retail beef sales
volume.
Estimated Revenue Loss
Having established that retail beef sales post-December 2003 have been lower than
would have been expected by a forecaster making an estimate during the pre-BSE
period, we next consider what retail beef revenues may have been under the status
quo, i.e., in the absence of any BSE announcement. One approach would be to derive
separate forecasts of sales volume and of price, and then multiply these two variables
together to obtain a forecast for retail sales revenue. However, as shown in figure 12,
the revenue series has historically tracked sales volume quite closely, indicating that
any forecast of the revenue series would likely be no worse than a forecast of the sales
volume series. Thus, our approach was to consider the retail sales revenue series
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3  These losses represent domestic revenue only. It is likely that U.S. beef exports were also adversely affected by
news of BSE in the U.S. herd.
In this simple-minded approach, the retail sales revenue series is assumed to be
a random walk with drift, similar to the volume series, which it so closely tracks. To
forecast sales revenue over the post-BSE period, we simply continue the trend beyond
November 2003, the last month in the pre-BSE period. In fact, OLS identifies no
significant trend in the pre-BSE data, so our estimate of future revenues is equal to
the pre-BSE average revenue. Note that because the volume data are expressed in
terms of an index, rather than in pounds, we can only make comparative statements
about different revenue levels. Thus figure 12 shows the derived revenue series in
terms of “nominal index dollars.”
Therefore, the pre-BSE average revenue (index) of 309 is compared to the actual
post-BSE sales revenue figures for each month, from December 2003 through
August 2004. The difference between these two revenue streams is our rough
measure of the impact of the BSE announcement on U.S. retail revenues. Moreover,
because the revenue series is calculated using the feature-weighted average price,
revenue figures may be somewhat overstated for December 2003 and January 2004,
months when beef features were largely absent from retailers’ circulars. Our estimate
thus is a conservative guess at sales revenue loss due to the demand shift. Figure 13
illustrates the estimated revenue loss as an area, showing actual post-announcement
retail sales revenues and the simple forecast assuming no BSE announcement.
The total forecasted revenue (index) for the period from December 2003 through
August 2004 is 2,781. The total actual revenue (index) for this period was 2,062,
which is 25.9% lower than predicted by our simple method. Again, working with
revenue figures developed using a volume index rather than pounds means that
comparative statements can only be made about different revenue levels; an actual
dollar amount cannot be derived. To gain a general idea of the size of this difference,
consider that 2001 U.S. consumer expenditures on beef totaled $57 billion. If no
BSE announcement had occurred, and the first eight months of 2004 had seen
similar sales revenues to 2001, the 25.9% reduction in sales revenues estimated here
would equate to $11.1 billion, in 2001 dollars.
3
Conclusion
Concern over the safety of the U.S. food supply has been increasingly discussed
since the first confirmed case of BSE in the United States in late December 2003,
coupled with the finding that BSE in beef is linked with the brain-wasting
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) in humans. This paper investigates the responsive-
ness of U.S. retail beef purchases to announcements such as these, and develops
forecasts of retail beef sales and sales revenue to assess the impact of the 2003 BSE
announcement.
In its initial response, the U.S. demand experience followed that of other
countries—i.e., there was a notable drop in supermarket sales following the BSE38   Spring 2005 Journal of Agribusiness
announcement. However, in contrast to the European experience, continuing low
purchases suggest that more than eight months after the initial BSE discovery, the
United States has yet to achieve a complete recovery, and in fact U.S. sales have
remained significantly below pre-BSE levels. The difference between these two
experiences may lie in the timing and type of government response designed to
restore consumer confidence, namely the testing criteria for at-risk cows.
Fitting an ARIMA model to the pre-BSE U.S. supermarket sales data results in
a model that can predict changes in sales volume well over the pre-BSE period, as
well as the post-BSE period from February 2004 through August 2004. The model
performs poorly at predicting changes for the months most affected by the BSE
announcement, December 2003 and January 2004. This indicates that although beef
sales were disrupted by the announcement during these two months, the underlying
process was relatively unaffected. Judging from the sales volume series, the ultimate
effect was to shift retail beef sales to a lower post-BSE level.
In an attempt to gauge the magnitude of the monetary impact of this level shift,
we projected pre-BSE average retail sales revenue over the post-BSE period. This
is our rough estimate of what post-BSE revenues would have been in the absence of
the BSE announcement. Comparing these estimates to the actual figures from
December 2003 through August 2004 shows a drop of 25.9% in retail sales revenue.
If the first eight months of 2004 (in the hypothetical absence of BSE) had seen sales
similar to those of 2001, this would mean a loss of $11.1 billion.
Even if U.S. retail sales manage to recover fully in the next several months, BSE
will remain a cause for concern. Given the disruption created by a single case of
BSE in the U.S. herd, further outbreaks of the disease could be expected to compound
the problems facing beef suppliers. The high costs that would likely accompany the
widespread disruption of the U.S. beef industry by additional BSE discoveries would
be a serious blow to producers, consumers, and the U.S. economy as a whole. It
seems prudent for the U.S. government to act now and take what precautions it can.
Mandating an expanded testing regime and disseminating information on best
practices for maintaining a safe U.S. food supply are the minimum first steps. As
new data become available in the coming months, researchers will be better able to
judge the status of a recovery in U.S. beef demand, and to quantify the effects of
U.S. government actions on food safety and consumer confidence.
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